THE REMARKABLE appreciation of the dollar since 1980 rivals the oil shocks of the 1970s as the most dramatic relative price change in the post-World War II world economy. It is widely agreed that the source of the increase in the price of the dollar is an increase in the attractiveness of dollar assets to investors around the world. But what makes U.S. assets more attractive? At the risk of being uncontroversial, I continue to believe that the increase over the last five years in the differential between real interest rates in the United States and those in other countries is the major identifiable factor. The idea is that higher interest rates attract foreign capital into the country, causing the dollar to appreciate until it has become so "overvalued" relative to its long-run equilibrium value that the market expects a future depreciation sufficient to offset the interest differential. As table 1 
long-term differentials. Such measures of the rate of return to equity capital as dividend-price ratios and earnings-price ratios have also behaved differently from real interest rates, as is their habit, though in table 2 they too show an increase in the differential between the United States and its trading partners. I A good argument for singling out the long-term real interest rate differential is that the ten-year differential can be thought of as reflecting how much the market expects the dollar to depreciate, in real terms, on average over the next ten years. A term of ten years, unlike one year, is probably long enough to assure a return of the real exchange rate to longrun equilibrium, whatever that may be. It follows that the market's current estimation of the "overvaluation" of the dollar relative to that long-run equilibrium can be estimated at ten times the ten-year real interest differential. Thus the 2.9 point differential implies that the market considers the dollar to be about 29 percent above its long-run real equilibrium, or 25 percent above it on a continuously compounded logarithmic basis. Compared with the 33 percent logarithmic real appreciation that the weighted dollar has experienced relative to its 1973-79 average, this 25 percent figure suggests that most of the real appreciation is attributable to an increase in the real interest differential. Relatively little seems attributable to a change in the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate.2 One good argument against this framework, a model originally developed by Peter Isard,3 is that dollar bonds may not be close substitutes for foreign bonds because of risk, with the result that the interest differential may not equal the expected rate of dollar depreciation. Risk may also explain why long-term bonds may not be close substitutes for short-term bonds, and why the long-term interest rate may not equal the average of expected future short-term rates. Risk would also account for the diversity in expected rates of return on bonds and equity capital. This problem is addressed further below. For now, I will assume that investors are risk-neutral or, alternatively, that the real exchange rate ten years in the future is certain, which would justify the use of the tenyear differential for exchange rate analysis.
Saving, Investment, and Net Capital Flows
If the increase in U.S. real interest rates since 1980 is the explanation for the real appreciation of the dollar, what is the explanation for the increase in real interest rates? There are two major competing hypotheses. Think of domestic investment as depending negatively on the real interest rate, and think of national saving-private saving plus public saving, which is the government budget surplus-as depending, presumably positively, on the real interest rate. The first hypothesis is that there has been a backward shift of the national saving function in the form of an increase in the federal budget deficit that, for whatever reason, has not been offset by an increase in private saving. The second hypothesis is that there has been an outward shift of the domestic investment function, attributed to more favorable tax treatment of capital as a result of the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act and the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, or more generally to an improved business climate. Either shift would drive up the real interest rate. To choose between them, one must look at the level of national saving and investment. A decline would support the first explanation; an increase, the second.
As figure 2 shows, U.S. national saving relative to GNP declined sharply from 1980 to 1982. Domestic investment fell too, but by less. The difference between the two is the decline in the current account position. The U.S. trade and current account deficits have repeatedly hit record levels in recent years, with the real appreciation of the dollar the major proximate cause. One could think of the 1980-82 fall in public saving as causing the decline in investment, the capital inflow, and the decline in the current account, all by means of the increase in real interest rates.
From the trough of the recession in November 1982 to the end of 1984, the situation was precisely the reverse. Saving and investment both increased with exceptional speed during the first two years of recovery, with investment leading the way. At present it seems that the capital Some have questioned whether the observed real interest rates provide a satisfactory way of thinking about exchange rate movementsthe four-year ascent of the dollar as well as the prospect of reversal. I now consider two alternative approaches that have been proposed. One is the view that the appreciation of the dollar has been the result of a speculative bubble, rather than being attributable to fundamentals. Another is a model in which portfolio preferences, in particular attitudes about risk, are central to determining the exchange rate. In both cases, the theoretical insights are not intended to be original, but in both cases, some quantitative illustrations are offered that have novel implications.
Is the Dollar on a Bubble Path?
As early as 1982, Rudiger Dornbusch applied the notion of stochastic rational bubbles, first developed by Olivier Blanchard, to the current episode of dollar appreciation.4 Assume that at any time, t, there is a probability P, that in the coming month the bubble will burst and the spot exchange rate S, will return to the long-run equilibrium level S, that is determined by fundamentals. Then a small short-term interest differential, equal to the forward discount FD, because of covered interest parity, is sufficient to support a large continuing overvaluation, measured by ln (S,IS,), provided that the bubble path, on which the spot rate will remain for one more period with probability 1 -P, constitutes continued appreciation at an exponential rate a, satisfying the following equation:
(1) FDt = Pt ln (S,/IS) + (1 -P,) ( -at).
(Here S is defined as the price of foreign currency.) We can solve for the implicit probability of collapse, Almost all the models of stochastic bubbles have assumed a constant probability of collapse P,. But empirically we can construct a different P, for each month of recent history. It is necessary only to assume a, constant at ai and to estimate a by regressing lnS, against a time trend. In an explicit bubble model of the level of the exchange rate, the rate of appreciation in the event of noncollapse would be a parameter determined by the derivative of the demand for the currency with respect to the expected rate of return.6 A regression for the period January 1981-March 1985 shows an exponential time trend of 7.80 percent a year (0.65 percent a month). Table 3 uses the estimated values of S and a to calculate P, for each month. Note that this model has the counterintuitive implication that, as a currency appreciates and thus has farther to fall in the event of a collapse, the probability of collapse must be smaller in order to give the same expected rate of depreciation as in equation 1. As of March 1985, the probability of collapse is (0.0025 + 0.0065)/(0.6400 + 0.0065) = 1.4 percent. To find the probability that the bubble could have lasted T periods, we simply take the product of (1 -P,) for t running from 1 to T; this cumulative probability of noncollapse is also reported in table 3.7 5. The appreciation of the dollar against a trade-weighted average of trading partners' currencies is considerably less, especially to the extent that Japan and Canada are given large weights based on U.S. trade. But, somewhat counterintuitively, a smaller overvaluation estimate would make a sustained bubble less probable in the calculations that follow, in order to satisfy equation 2.
6. The errors in the time trend regression would have to be attributed to transitory fluctuations in fundamentals or in the coefficient on the exponential bubble term. If such fluctuations are thought to be permanent, the econometrics could be performed in first difference form. Furthermore, most bubble models specify a constant elasticity of currency demand rather than derivative, implying that it is the log of the exchange rate rather than the level that grows exponentially on a bubble path (relative to fundamentals). Richard Meese uses first differences of logs in his test for recurring stochastic bubbles; see 7. Note that no special assumption of independence is needed in order to multiply the probabilities. Each P, is the market's evaluation of the probability of collapse during the coming period conditional on the bubble having lasted to period t. The probability that a bubble could have lasted to March 1985 is only 16 percent. Although this is evidence against the hypothesis that a bubble in fact explains the appreciation of the dollar,8 it is not as low a probability as would be required to reject a hypothesis in a formal statistical test.
One might think that a more plausible alternative to a hypothesis attributing all of the dollar's real appreciation to a bubble is a hypothesis that attributes part to a bubble and part to the real interest rate or other fundamentals. But it turns out that this alternative hypothesis is less likely to be true. This is the consequence of the property of the model that, with the forward discount rate little changed over the period, P, is larger the nearer the exchange rate is to equilibrium. For example, consider the hypothesis that at each point in time, half the real appreciation has been due to a bubble. Then to satisfy equation 2, P, would have to be almost twice as high. As of March 1985 the probability of collapse would be 2.8 percent. The cumulative probability of noncollapse from January 1981 through March 1985 would be only 2 percent. Thus we can "reject at the 95 percent confidence level" the hypothesis that half the real appreciation is due to a bubble. We could reject at even higher confidence levels the hypothesis that one-quarter or any smaller (but finite) fraction of the appreciation has been a bubble. The possibility of recurring shorter term bubbles, however, remains.
Implications of Mean-Variance Optimization
Even if the appreciation of the dollar is not attributed to a speculative bubble but rather to the increase in the real interest differential or to other fundamentals, there remains the key question of how long it can continue. So far this paper has assumed that investors are indifferent between holding dollar assets and foreign assets that pay the same expected rate of return. But if investors around the world consider dollar assets to be imperfect substitutes for foreign assets, then a given expected rate of return will not be adequate to induce them to hold ever growing quantities of dollar assets at an undiminished value for the dollar, let 8. The probability that the bubble could have lasted until March 1985 is of course much higher if one assumes that it did not appear until later. For example, if we begin at August 1982, then the cumulative probability of noncollapse is 38 percent. (The exponential time trend is 9.76 percent a year.) alone at ever higher values for the dollar. We know that either the return differential will have to rise to induce investors to hold the growing quantities of dollars, or the value of the dollar will have to decline, or both. How important are these factors quantitatively? How much is it asking of investors to accept an additional $100 billion of dollar assets into their portfolios every year? Efforts to estimate the degree of substitutability by regression of asset quantities and rates of return are seldom successful. As a source of additional information on the parameters in investors' asset-demand functions, there is little practical alternative to the theory of meanvariance optimization.
It can be shown that investors who maximize a function of the mean and variance of end-of-period wealth will allocate their portfolios according to where Xt is the share of the portfolio allocated to foreign assets (or a vector of shares allocated to the various foreign currencies); Rt is the expected return differential on foreign and dollar assets (or a vector of such differentials); Ql is the variance of the return differential (or a variance-covariance matrix); and p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which is assumed constant. Intuitively, an increase in the expected return on a particular asset will induce investors to shift more of their portfolios into that asset; but the more important investors consider risk diversification (that is, the larger is p or fl), the less they will shift their portfolios in response to a given change in expected returns. In the special case where the prices of the goods in an investor' s consumption basket are nonstochastic when expressed in the currency of the producing country, R, reduces exactly to the exchange risk premium, defined as the expected logarithmic depreciation of the dollar, minus the interest differential: The implication is that it is perfectly legitimate to infer from the forward discount that, in the market's view, the dollar will depreciate at about 3 percent per year in expected value terms. This argument strengthens the rationale for using interest differentials in the Isard model and the bubble calculations described earlier in this paper. The mean-variance optimization theory also implies that the degree of substitutability between long-term bonds and short-term bonds or between bonds and equities, just as that between U.S. and European financial assets, is so high as to render risk premiums negligible. 13 A closed-economy finance economist might wonder how capital mobility could be so high in the sense that it forces uncovered nominal interest parity to hold to within a few basis points, as explained above, and yet could be so low in the sense that it allows real interest differentials as large as 290 basis points, as shown in table 1, to persist for several years. We need not search far for the answer. For uncovered nominal interest parity to imply real interest parity, it is necessary that relative purchasing power parity hold so that the rate of currency depreciation is expected to equal the inflation differential. It is well known that purchasing power parity does not in fact hold empirically, even approximately and even over ten-year horizons.
It is sometimes claimed that if capital were perfectly mobile, a decline in national saving that put incipient upward pressure on the real interest rate would attract a sufficiently large capital inflow to prevent any observed rise in the real interest rate or crowding out of domestic 13. In the closed-economy context, the same argument implies that an increase in the supply of government debt of 1 percent of U.S. household wealth raises the risk premium on long-term government bonds by only 0.84 basis point over the short-term interest rate. See Frankel, "Portfolio Crowding Out Empirically Estimated," Qiulaterlv Jollrnal of Economics, forthcoming. Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers agree that these numbers are small and thus that substitutability is high. See Blanchard and Summers, "Perspectives," p. 312. investment. 14 But results from international finance imply that the observed high correlation of domestic saving and investment and the observed failure of real interest parity have little to do with world capital markets and much to do with world goods markets. International portfolio investors have reason to arbitrage away gaps in countries' nominal rates of return when expressed in a common numeraire; but they have no reason to arbitrage away a gap between the domestic rate of return expressed in terms of domestic goods and the foreign rate of return expressed in terms of foreign goods. One could say that the U.S. real interest rate is high because the dollar is overvalued and is expected to depreciate in real terms (because expected dollar inflation in U.S. goods is lower than in foreign goods), as easily as that the dollar is overvalued because the U.S. real interest rate is high.
The Effect of Foreign Exchange Intervention
If the high real value of the dollar is indeed attributable to the high real interest differential, and if the high real interest differential is attributable to the monetary-fiscal policy mix in the United States relative to abroad, the prospects for an early reversal might appear dim. If we take it as a constraint that the monetary-fiscal policy mix will be such as to keep interest rates from falling, does foreign exchange intervention offer an alternative way of bringing down the value of the dollar?1" The difficulty of finding a statistically significant risk premium supports the proposition that domestic and foreign bonds are close substitutes. It is tempting to reason that as the degree of substitutability becomes very high and the effect of intervention on the risk premium becomes very small, the effect of intervention on the level of the exchange rate must also vanish. But this is one of those cases in which there may be no such thing as being "just a little bit pregnant." Theory says that the limiting case of perfect substitutability and a zero risk premium would hold only in the case of risk neutrality, or the netting out of all assets as being "inside." If this limiting case holds, then it is indeed true that intervention has no effect on either the risk premium or the exchange rate. But, as I have just shown, effects on the risk premium are extremely small in magnitude even in a more realistic model where bonds are outside assets and there is a conventional degree of risk aversion.
It is true that with high substitutability, it requires very small changes in interest rates to accommodate changes in supplies of assets without changing exchange rates. On the other hand, in the absence of any changes in interest rates, under conventional assumptions about asset demands, changes in supplies would require nonnegligible changes in exchange rates. I now illustrate this point more formally.
The share of the total portfolio W allocated to foreign assets F, with dollar value SF, is defined as 
_ D X(R) F I1-X(R).
When the relative supply of dollar assets DIF is increased with interest rates held constant, the dollar will depreciate. 16 If there is no effect on 16. Intervention that holds the interest rate constant is equivalent to sterilized intervention, which holds the money supply constant, only in the special case (as in an IS-the expectations term contained in R, so that X(R) is constant, then the effect on S will be proportionate to the change in DIF. If, instead, expectations are altered by the increase in dollar assets, the effect will be larger. If the increase in D leads rational investors to expect further increases in D in the future, then they will expect further depreciation in the future and respond by decreasing today the share of their portfolio they wish to allocate to dollars; the effect on S will be more than proportionate. For example, if the expected permanent rate of growth of DIF goes up as little as 0.1 percent per annum, our 0.02 estimate of (pQl) implies that the demand X will go up by 5.0 percent of W and that S will go up by at least 20.0 percent. 17 This reflects the great sensitivity of asset demands to expected rates of return in the model when p is as low as 2.0. If the degree of substitutability is less than the value implied by the mean-variance optimization theory, the effect will be smaller.
The implication of this analysis is that a one-shot intervention can affect exchange rates, but, by conventional measures, the dollar amounts of intervention would have to be very large. On the other hand, a credible policy of increasing the expected permanent growth rate of dollar assets relative to foreign assets can have substantial effects, although it may have other undesirable consequences, for example, for inflation. If asked for recommendations on how to bring the dollar down, we are left with little practical alternative to a shift in the monetary-fiscal mix to decrease the real interest rate.
LM model) where money demand depends on the interest rate but not on the supply of bonds, and where the price level does not respond to the exchange rate. In a full portfoliobalance model, intervention would have to increase the supplies of both bonds and money to keep the interest rate constant. But the issue of how the demand for dollar assets divides up between money and bonds cannot be answered by the framework of mean-variance optimization. This is why I simply assume that monetary policy is whatever it must be to keep interest rates constant.
17. Taking 
Is the Present Course Sustainable?
Even if there is neither a change in macroeconomic policy nor a bubble collapse, the flows presently created by the government deficit and current account deficit may themselves bring the dollar down. A $200 billion budget deficit works to depreciate the cdollar at a rate proportionate to the rate of increase in dollar debt, if equation 9 holds and the risk premium does not change. But foreign governments are creating debt at similar rates. Assume that the two factors roughly cancel out, so that DIF is unchanged. There is still the fact that the U. S. current account deficit is reducing the wealth of U.S. residents at the rate of $100 billion a year and transferring this wealth to foreign residents. Foreign residents have a much lower propensity to hold wealth in the form of dollar assets than do U.S. residents, on the assumption that equation 5 holds, that foreign residents consume more foreign goods than U.S. residents do, and that everyone has a coefficient of risk aversion p greater than one. In equation 5, if (x is close to zero for U.S. residents and close to one for foreign residents and p is two, then the difference in A for the two classes of residents is close to one-half. If R is unchanged in equation 3, the effect of a current account deficit equal to 1 percent of world wealth is to depreciate the dollar by close to expected rate of depreciation. In the short run, anything can happen, depending on what happens to expectations: if investors' expected rate of dollar depreciation declines over time, then it could offset the adverse flow factors, and the dollar could in fact remain strong. But would such a path for the expected and actual exchange rate be realistic in the long run? Or must it become obviously unjustifiable, and increasingly so, as time passes?
Our estimate of pQ1 = 0.02 suggests that the 6.4 percent effect of the $100 billion current account deficit could be absorbed without any decline in the dollar, if instead R were forced up at 0.13 each year. The interest differential could easily go up by 13 points each year; the number is so small as to be not even noticeable at first. But it does seem a situation that cannot proceed forever, especially if one considers that the U.S. budget and current account deficits would grow with interest payments. This suggests strongly that the dollar must come down eventually. One would then expect that investors' perceptions of the long-run fate of the dollar would bring about the event in the shorter run.
